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Abstract
A revocable-storage attribute-based encryption (RS-ABE) scheme is
an encryption scheme which extends attribute-based encryption by intro-
ducing user revocation. A key-policy RS-ABE scheme links each key to
an access structure. We propose a new key-policy RS-ABE scheme whose
security we prove in term of indistinguishability under a chosen-plaintext
attack (IND-CPA).
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1 Introduction
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a flavor of public-key encryption which has seen
a growing interest in the last years. An ABE scheme builds its ciphertexts and its keys
employing attributes. Attributes are used to manage the access to a certain document
using a fixed key. In a key-policy ABE scheme each ciphertext links the encrypted
plaintext to a set of attributes, and each key is linked to an access structure. An
access structure is a list of sets of attributes which the key is able to decrypt. Thus
a key can decrypt a ciphertext if and only if the set of attributes of the ciphertext
belongs to the access structure of the key. In a similar way, a ciphertext-policy reverses
the roles of set of attributes and access structure: in this case, a key is associated with
the set of attributes, and a ciphertext with an access structure. The choice between
key-policy and ciphertext-policy depends on the final application of the scheme. For
example, a digital television platform could favour key policy to manage their TV
licenses: associating attributes to encrypted programs, the clients are able to decrypt
only the programs which belong to their license. Conversely, a bank could prefer a
ciphertext policy to manage the work of its personnel: if we associate attributes to the
cryptographic keys of each employee, then each member is able to decrypt only the
documents within their competence, i.e., those corresponding to attributes associated
with their keys. Different ABE constructions have been proposed over time, with
gradually increased security, reliability and efficiency. For this reason the concept of
ABE has been extended in order to widen its use-cases. Our interest lies specifically
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on user revocation and in this paper we design a public-key scheme which enjoys ABE
for encryption, while allowing to revoke users arbitrarily. This is the goal of revocable-
storage attribute-based encryption (RS-ABE), a scheme described by Lee et al. [8]
employing a ciphertext policy. To be more precise, our aim is to build a key-policy
version of such scheme and to prove its security in a theoretical framework fit to the
application context. Starting from the ideas in [8], we modify concepts and techniques
described therein to adapt them to our goals.
We observe that a key-policy RS-ABE scheme was independently described by Lee [7],
but we employ a different construction and different security assumptions, reaching an
independent security result.
In Section 2 we describe the RS-ABE framework, and we give the definition of
CPA-security. In Section 3 we describe the assumptions required for the security of
our scheme. In Section 4 we give an overview of the building blocks of our scheme:
Complete Subset (CS), Self-Updatable Encryption (SUE) and key-policy Attribute
Based Encryption. In Section 5 we are finally able to describe our scheme in detail
and state our main result on its security. Section 6 is entirely devoted to the proof of
our claimed theorem. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss the efficiency of our key-policy
RS-ABE scheme and draw some conclusions, sketching future work.
2 Structure
We provide a high-level description of a key-policy revocable-storage attribute-based
encryption scheme. A is the set of all possible attributes and an access structure A is
a set of subsets of A (for a formal definition, see Definition 7). Moreover we denote
with U the set of all users. Starting from A and other public parameters, an authority
C must create some public information (PI) and two general keys: the general public
key and the master key. The public information contains the general setting and is
known to everyone. The general public key, which we shorten to public key (PK),
can be used by any user to encrypt, even by anyone having access to the system and
knowing only PI and PK. The master key (MK) is used only by C to create the
users’ private keys (no user has a personal public key), when user requests it, and the
(general) time-update key (TK), at any time update. The latter is known to everyone
and incorporates the information on the updated list of revoked users. In order to
decrypt, any user needs her own private key (SK), TK and PI.
This scheme is described by seven Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) algorithms.
Setup (λ,A, Tmax, Nmax) 7→ (MK,PI,PK). λ is the security parameter, A is the set
of all possible attributes, Tmax is the maximum time which can be used inside
the system, Nmax is the total number of users who can receive a key. W.l.o.g.
we can assume Nmax = 2
d with d ≥ 1. The outputs are the master (private) key,
the public information and the (general) public key.
GenKey (PI,PK,MK,A, u) 7→ SKA,u. The inputs are
• all three outputs of Setup, that is, PI, PK, and MK,
• A, an access structure listing the sets of attributes which the key is able
to decrypt, and
• u, the user assignee of the key.
The output is SKA,u, the private key for the user u.
UpdateKey (PI,PK,MK, T, R) 7→ TKT,R. This function generates a key which
links the time T with a set of revoked users R. The remaining inputs are PI,
PK, and MK. The output is TKT,R, the time-update key for the time T (and
with revoked users R).
2
Encrypt (PI,PK,M, S, T ) 7→ CTS,T . The inputs are PI, PK, a plaintextM , S ⊆ A
(the set of attributes required to decrypt the plaintext) and the encryption time
T . The output is CTS,T , the ciphertext.
Decrypt (PI,CTS,T ,SKA,u,TKT ′,R) 7→M . This is the function merging together
both the secret key SKA,u and the time-update key TKT ′,R to decrypt a cipher-
text CTS,T . Moreover, the public information PI is used. The output is M , the
decrypted plaintext.
UpdateCT (PI,PK,CTS,T ) 7→ CTS,T+1. The goal of this function is to update the
time T of a ciphertext CTS,T by a unit, using only PI and PK. The output is
CTS,T+1, a ciphertext for the same plaintext of CTS,T , but with updated time.
W.l.o.g. we will always assume that the set U of users is the largest possible, that
is, |U| = Nmax = 2
d.
The correctness of a scheme describes which keys can decrypt a ciphertext. This
scheme is correct if, fixing any PI, PK, and MK obtained as output of Setup, for
any plaintext M and any ciphertext CTS,T output of Encrypt, for any key SKA,u
output of GenKey, and any key TKT ′,R output of UpdateKey, then the output of
Decrypt(PI,CTS,T ,SKA,u,TKT ′,R) is exactly M when all the following are true:
• u 6∈ R, i.e., the user u is not revoked;
• T ≤ T ′, i.e., the ciphertext is older than the update key;
• S ∈ A, i.e., the set of attributes of the ciphertext is authorized by the key.
We also require that, for any ciphertext CTS,T output of Encrypt(PK,M, S, T ),
decrypting the output of UpdateCT(PK,CTS,T ) yields the same as decrypting the
output of Encrypt(PK,M, S, T + 1).
2.1 Definition of security
The security of our scheme is described in term of indistinguishability under a chosen-
plaintext attack (IND-CPA). An informal description follows.
An adversary is allowed to query the challenger for a polynomial number of private
keys and time-update keys. When satisfied, the adversary presents two different plain-
texts M0∗ and M
1
∗ ; one of them is randomly chosen by the challenger and given back
encrypted (CT∗) to the adversary. The adversary may then continue querying the
challenger for other private keys and time-update keys, and must eventually decide
which plaintext between M0∗ and M
1
∗ corresponds to CT∗. Informally, we may con-
sider an RS-ABE scheme secure if the adversary cannot reliably guess which of the
two messages was encrypted.
We now provide the corresponding formal security game.
Definition 1. The security game describing IND-CPA is played by a PPT adversary
A and a challenger C, and consists of five distinct phases. At the start we fix the
attributes A, the maximum time Tmax, the number of users Nmax, and the security
parameter λ. Each of these parameters are known by both A and C.
Setup C runs Setup(λ,A, Tmax, Nmax) to obtain the master secret key MK, the public
information PI and the public key PK. The former is kept secret by C, while the
others are given to A.
Query, I A is now allowed to query C. The maximum number of allowed queries
nIq is polynomial with respect to λ. The queries
1 may be of two different types:
private-key queries, indexed with i, or time-update queries, indexed with j.
1The querying process is adaptive, i.e., the choice for the type of query and the input for
the next query may depend on the output of the previous queries.
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1. (private-key query) A chooses a pair (Ai, ui) consisting of an access
structure Ai and a user ui who was not previously requested. C runs
GenKey(PI,PK,MK,Ai, ui) and gives the output SKAi,ui to A.
2. (time-update query) A selects a pair (Tj , Rj), where Rj is an arbitrary set
of users and Tj is a time for which there was no previous request for a
private key (∀k < j, Tj 6= Tk). C runs UpdateKey(PI,PK,MK, Tj , Rj) and
hands its output TKTj ,Rj to A.
Challenge A chooses two plaintexts M0∗ and M
1
∗ , together with a time T∗ and a set
of attributes S∗. We require also that, for each previous private-key query i and
time-update query j occurring in Query I, the following condition holds2
(S∗ 6∈ Ai) or (ui ∈ Rj) or (T∗ > Tj).
C selects randomly a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and runs Encrypt(PI,PK,Mb∗ , S∗, T∗).
The obtained output CT∗ is returned to A.
Query, II This phase is similar3 to the previous querying phase. A can continue
to query C a polynomial number of times with respect to λ with two possible
requests.
1. (private-key query) A chooses a pair (Ai, ui), where ui was not previously
requested, such that
• S∗ 6∈ Ai, or
• for each k ≤ j such that T∗ ≤ Tk, then ui ∈ Rk .
C runs GenKey(PI,PK,MK,Ai, ui) and gives the output SKAi,ui to A.
2. (time-update query) A selects a pair (Tj , Rj), where Rj is an arbitrary set
of users and Tj is a time that was no previous requested for a previous
time-update key (∀k < j, Tj 6= Tk) such that
• T∗ > Tj, or
• for each k ≤ i such that S∗ ∈ Ak, then uk ∈ Rj .
C runs UpdateKey(PI,PK,MK, Tj , Rj) and gives the output TKTj ,Rj to A.
Guess A outputs a guess b∗ for the value of b.
If the output is correct, the adversary wins the game. The advantage of the adversary
A is defined as the likelihood of making the right guess for b:
Adv
RS-ABE
A (λ) =
∣∣∣∣P [b = b∗]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Since the output of the functions shaping the scheme may depend on randomly cho-
sen parameters, the advantage is described in term of the probability over all possible
choices for their output considering their distribution.
Definition 2. A function η(λ) is negligible in λ if for every c > 0 and for every k > 0
there exists λ0 > 0 such that |η(λ)| <
∣∣ 1
cλk
∣∣ for all λ > λ0.
Definition 3 (Security). The RS-ABE scheme is said to be IND-CPA-secure, or
secure for a chosen-plaintext attack, if the advantage of a PPT adversary is negligible
with respect to the security parameter λ.
2Since T∗ and S∗ are going to be used in the encryption, A must not be able to decrypt
the message using the keys she previously queried.
3with the additional restriction that any key which would allow A to simply use Decrypt
cannot be requested. The querying process is again adaptive.
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Notice how the use of UpdateCT does not allow the adversary to request a key
that would allow the decryption of an updated ciphertext, because of the restrictions
of the challenge phase and second-query phase.
Notice that the update key is not required to be secret.
The aim of this paper is to propose a key-policy RS-ABE scheme which can be
shown to be secure for a chosen-plaintext attack if the three assumptions in the next
section hold.
3 Assumptions
We work in the context of composite-order bilinear groups, adapted for the special
case N = p1p2p3, where each pi is a prime number. This is a concept first introduced
by Boneh et al. [2].
Definition 4 (Bilinear group). A bilinear group (of composite order three) is identified
by the tuple ((N,G, G˜, e), p1, p2, p3), where:
1. p1, p2 and p3 are three distinct primes, and N = p1p2p3;
2. G and G˜ are two cyclic groups of order N ;
3. e : G×G→ G˜ is a map such that:
• (bilinear) for every h, k ∈ G and α, β ∈ ZN , e(h
α, kβ) = e(h, k)αβ;
• (non-degenerate) there exists g ∈ G such that e(g, g) generates G˜.
Definition 5. A group descriptor (of composite order three) is
a tuple ((N,G, G˜, e), p1, p2, p3, g¯1, g¯2, g¯3) such that
• the tuple ((N,G, G˜, e), p1, p2, p3) is a bilinear group;
• the group operations of G and G˜ and the map e are efficiently computable;
• g¯1 is a generator of Gp1 , g¯2 is a generator of Gp2 and g¯3 is a generator of Gp3 ,
where Gm is the subgroup of G with order m.
Remark 1. The three generators g¯1, g¯2, and g¯3 are only used implicitly to generate
random element of the group G and its subgroups Gp1 , Gp2 , and Gp3 .
We observe that g = g¯1g¯2g¯3 generates G, that g
p2p3 is a generator of Gp1 and that
every element of Gp1 has the form g
αp2p3 for some α ∈ N.
Definition 6. A group descriptor generator G is a polynomial algorithm which takes
as input the security parameter λ and outputs a group descriptor
G (λ) = ((N,G, G˜, e), p1, p2, p3, g¯1, g¯2, g¯3) such that the group operations and the bi-
linear map are computable in polynomial time with respect to λ.
The group descriptor G (λ) contains all the parameters used by the challenger for
generating random elements of the group G and its subgroups. The adversary knows
only the tuple (N,G, G˜, e), which allows him to compute group operations and the
bilinear map.
The following three assumptions fix the properties which must hold for a group
descriptor generator G , used in Setup (page 2). With the notation r ← R we specify
that we are choosing an element r among the elements of R using a uniform random
distribution. These assumptions were introduced by Lewko et al. [9]. Notice that in
the following the element gi belongs to Gpi , and the element identified with the letters
X, Y , and Z belong respectively to Gp1 , Gp2 , and Gp3 .
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Assumption 1 (Subgroup decision problem). Let G be a group descriptor generator
and for any λ compute G (λ). We choose randomly the following elements: g1 ← Gp1 ;
g3 ← Gp3 ; and we call D =
(
(N,G, G˜, e), g1, g3
)
. We choose randomly two other
elements: W1 ← Gp1 ; W2 ← Gp1p2 . The advantage of an algorithm A is defined as:
|P [A (D,W1) = 1]− P [A (D,W2) = 1]| .
This advantage is denoted with AdvA1A . We say that G satisfies Assumption 1 if for
any PPT algorithm A we have that AdvA1A is a negligible function with respect to λ.
The previous assumption could be informally rephrased as follows. An adversary A
returns 1, i.e A (D,W ) = 1, if and only if she thinks that W is in the small subgroup
Gp1 , knowing that in any case W is in the large subgroup Gp1p2 . Her advantage is
a measurement of the correctness of her guess. In the case she is randomly guessing,
she would return 1 half of the times and so her advantage would be zero. What we
want with this assumption is to make any adversary at most negligibly better than a
random guess.
Assumption 2 (General subgroup decision problem). Let G be a group descriptor
generator and for any λ compute G (λ). We choose randomly the following elements:
g1, X1 ← Gp1 ; Y1, Y2 ← Gp2 ; g3, Z1 ← Gp3 ; and we call
D =
(
(N,G, G˜, e), g1, g3, X1Y1, Y2Z1
)
. We choose randomly two other elements: W1 ←
G; W2 ← Gp1p3 . The advantage of an algorithm A is defined as:
|P [A (D,W1) = 1]− P [A (D,W2) = 1]| .
This advantage is denoted with AdvA2A . We say that G satisfies Assumption 2 if for
any PPT algorithm A we have that AdvA2A is a negligible function with respect to λ.
In this assumption, A is trying to guess if W is in the subgroup Gp1p3 , knowing that
in any case W is in group G.
Assumption 3 (Composite Diffie-Hellman problem). Let G be a group descriptor
generator and for any λ compute G (λ). We choose randomly the following elements:
α, s ← ZN ; g1 ← Gp1 ; g2, Y1, Y2 ← Gp2 ; g3 ← Gp3 ; and we call
D =
(
(N,G, G˜, e), g1, g2, g3, g
α
1 Y1, g
s
1Y2
)
. We choose randomly another element W1 ←
G˜, and we fix W2 = e(g1, g1)
sα. The advantage of an algorithm A is defined as:
|P [A (D,W1) = 1]− P [A (D,W2) = 1]| .
This advantage is denoted with AdvA3A . We say that G satisfies Assumption 3 if for
any PPT algorithm A we have that AdvA3A is a negligible function with respect to λ.
4 Building blocks
We build our original key policy RS-ABE, starting from the ideas described by Lee et
al. [8] and adapting them to the key-policy case. To construct the scheme we outline
three different schemes, which are later merged to form RS-ABE. These schemes are
the complete subset scheme (CS) [13], a self-updatable encryption scheme (SUE ) [8],
and an attribute-based encryption scheme (ABE ) [10].
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4.1 Notation
In the following construction we employ perfect binary trees. A perfect binary tree
T of depth d is a binary tree where all leaf nodes has depth d, and all other nodes
have exactly two children. Obviously, exactly 2d leaves hang from T. Each node of T
is denoted νi, where the index i is assigned using breadth-first search on the tree. In
other words, the root node has index 0, the left child of νi has index 2i + 1 and the
right child has index 2i+ 2.
For each node νi we call Si the maximal subtree of T having νi as root node. Clearly,
Si is a perfect binary tree. To say that a node ν belongs to a subtree S we write ν ∈ S.
In our case, each user in U = {u1, . . . , uNmax} is associated to a leaf of the tree
and vice versa. Sometimes, uj will denote the leaf corresponding to the user. The
set Ui ⊂ U contains all users associated with a leaf of the subtree Si, in other words,
all users whose leaf meets the node νi in the path from the leaf to the root node (see
Figure 1).
νi
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 u6 u7 u8
Figure 1: The solid line represents the subtree Si with root νi and the box represents
the set Ui.
The Steiner tree S = S(T, R), for a tree T and a proper set of users R ⊂ U, is the
smallest subtree of T containing the root node and the leaves associated to all users
in R. Observe that a Steiner tree is binary perfect only if R = ∅.
4.2 Complete subset scheme
The complete-subset scheme is a particular implementation of the subset cover frame-
work, introduced by Naor et al. [13]. We use the same implementation described by
Lee et al. [8]. Notice that the subset-cover scheme as we describe it is not a full-fledged
encryption mechanism, but rather a framework upon which we build encryption. Our
main use of a CS scheme is to handle revoked users.
The CS scheme is described by the following four functions.
CS.Setup (Nmax) 7→ T: we take the number of users Nmax = 2
d as an input and we
build a perfect binary tree T with depth d. Then we assign to each user in U a
unique leaf of the tree. The tree T is the output of this function.
CS.Assign (T, u) 7→ PVu: given the users’ tree T and a user u ∈ U, we output as
private set the subsets in U of the form Ui which contains u:
PVu = {Ui | u ∈ Ui} ⊂ P(U),
where P(U) is the power set of U.
Observe that |PVu| = d.
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CS.Cover (T, R) 7→ CVR: we consider the Steiner tree S = S(T, R). We denote with
νk1 , . . . , νkm all children of a node in S which are not in S. The covering set
CVR is then (see Figure 2):
CVR = {Uk1 , . . . , Ukm} ⊂ P(U).
Notice that CVR is a partition of UrR.
u1 u2
νk2
u3 u4 u5 u6 u7 u8
Figure 2: R = {u2, u5, u7, u8}. The solid subtree is the Steiner tree S(T, R), the gray
leaves are the revoked users, νk1 = u1, νk2 6∈ U, νk3 = u6, Uk1 = {u1}, Uk2 = {u3, u4},
Uk3 = {u6}.
CS.Match (CVR,PVu) 7→ U : we find a match between a covering set CVR and a
private set PVu simply by considering the (unique) element in the intersection
of the two sets, U ∈ CVR ∩ PVu, when it exists (see Figure 3). The output is
U if U exists, empty otherwise. A match exists if and only if the user is not
revoked. It must be unique, since CVR is a partition.
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 u6 u7 u8
Figure 3: Considering Figure 2, the box is the output of CS.Match for
PVu3 =
{
{u3}, {u3, u4}, {u1, u2, u3, u4},U
}
.
Remark 2. It is worth considering the size of the private set and of the covering set.
Recall that Nmax = 2
d and let |R| = r then [13]
|PVu| = log 2(Nmax) = d;
|CVR| ≤ r log 2(Nmax/r) = r(d− log 2(r)).
4.3 Self-updatable encryption scheme
The self-updatable encryption scheme (SUE) manages the evolution of the system,
introducing a discrete time structure used to equip ciphertexts and keys with specific
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times. The basic idea behind this scheme is to associate (with depth-first search)
each time with a node of a perfect binary tree and then to employ the ciphertext-
delegatable encryption scheme (CDE) [8] to validate the time of the given decryption
key, exploiting the tree structure. This allows to identify the nodes associated with a
time bigger than a certain threshold, by using a small number of keys.
Here we present a high-level description of the SUE scheme. The SUE scheme is
characterized by the following five PPT algorithms, the detailed description is provided
by Lee et al. [8].
SUE.Setup (S , Tmax) 7→ (MK,PI,PK): given a string
4
S = ((N,G, G˜, e), g1, p1, p2, p3)
and the maximum admissible time Tmax ∈ N, it outputs the master key MK,
which is used by the authority C to create private keys, the public information
PI and the (general) public key PK. In particular, we choose randomly the
elements β ∈ ZN and Z ∈ Gp3 . The outputs of the function are MK = (β, Z),
PI = (N,G, G˜, e) and the (general) public key PK, that is, a string containing
g = g1, e(g, g)
β and some randomly chosen elements in Gp1 .
SUE.GenKey (PI,PK,MK, T ′) 7→ SKT ′ : given the public information PI, the public
key PK, the master key MK and a time T ′, it outputs a private key SKT ′
associated T ′.
SUE.Encrypt (PI,PK, T,M) 7→ (C,CHT ): given the public information PI, the pub-
lic key PK, a time T and a plaintext M , it outputs the ciphertext C and the
ciphertext header CHT associated with the time T . In particular, we choose
randomly an element s ∈ ZN and a session key EK = e(g, g)
sβ is computed.
With EK, we compute C =M · EK and we do not output EK.
SUE.Decrypt (PI,SKT ′ ,CHT , C) 7→ (EK,M): given the public information PI, a
ciphertext (C,CHT ) for the time T and a secret key SKT ′ for the time T
′, first
it computes EK from the ciphertext header CHT and thenM = C ·EK
−1. Note
that the output might be empty in case the given key is not allowed to decrypt
the ciphertext.
SUE.UpdateCT (PI,PK,CHT ) 7→ CHT+1: given the public information PI, the pub-
lic key PK and a ciphertext CHT associated with a time T , it outputs a cipher-
text CHT+1 associated with the time T+1, which decrypts to the same plaintext
of CHT
SUE.RandomizeCT (PI,PK,CHT ) 7→ CHT : given the public information PI, the
public key PK and a ciphertext CHT for the time T , it outputs a ciphertext
CHT for the same time T . This function takes a ciphertext and transforms it
to another one, associated with the same time, but which decrypts to the same
plaintext.5
The correctness of this scheme is characterized by a correct decryption:
SUE.Decrypt(PI,SKT ′ ,CHT , C) = (EK,M)
when T is a time less or equal than T ′, or otherwise empty. This must be true for
every output of SUE.Setup, any valid times T , T ′, any ciphertext (C,CHT ) generated
by SUE.Encrypt and any private key SKT ′ generated by SUE.GenKey. We require also
that for any ciphertext (C,CHT ), the decryption of (C,CHT ) offers the same plaintext
as the the decryption of (C,SUE.RandomizeCT). The distribution of the outputs of
SUE.RandomizeCT must be equal to the distribution of the outputs of SUE.Encrpyt.
4we might as well give a group descriptor.
5The function is named “Randomize” because it changes the internal randomness used to
create the ciphertext.
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4.4 Attribute-based encryption scheme
The attribute-based encryption scheme (ABE) regulates the access to ciphertexts with
respect to the presence or absence of specific attributes. ABE is an encryption scheme
delineated for the first time by Sahai and Waters [15]. The first fully secure ABE
scheme is described by Lewko et al. [10], and this is the scheme we are going to employ.
Various other results for ABE are described in [3, 4, 16], and a non-monotonic ABE
scheme in [14].
Definition 7 (Access structure). An attribute is an element of a given finite set
A = {a1, . . . , an}, the set of all attributes. An access structure is a non-empty subset
of P (A). An access structure A is monotonic if for any S ∈ A we have that also all
supersets of S belong to A.
From now on we consider implicitly only monotonic access structure.
We can find two different forms of ABE schemes, depending on the position of
attributes and access structure between the key and the ciphertext. The differentiation
was first stated in [5].
• A ciphertext-policy (CP) ABE scheme provides each ciphertext with an access
structure A (from which the name “ciphertext-policy”), and each secret key with
a set of attributes S.
• A key-policy (KP) ABE scheme does exactly the converse: it provides each secret
key with an access structure A, and each ciphertext with a set of attributes S.
A general method to transform a KP-ABE in a CP-ABE scheme is discussed in [6].
We are going to describe the KP version of the scheme of Lewko [10], since we are
going to construct our RS-ABE scheme from it. A key-policy RS-ABE scheme was in-
dependently described by Lee [7]; however the author employs a different construction
and different assumptions to prove the security of the scheme.
4.4.1 Linear Secret Sharing Scheme.
Before describing the construction of the ABE algorithm, we have to recall the con-
struction of a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) that is used in order to manage the
attribute structure. For more details about LSSS see [1].
The classical construction, that we are going to present, distributes the shares to
each LSSS user. However in an ABE scheme the role of the LSSS users is played by
the attributes in A. So we will use the set A for the set of LSSS users, with ah ∈ A
denoting any LSSS user.
Let G = Zp1p2p3 be the set of the possible secrets. A linear secret sharing scheme
(LSSS) for a secret s ∈ G is a scheme constructed with the following procedure.
1. Let m ∈ N be a public parameter. The authority knows the secret s and chooses
a random element ~r = (r2, . . . , rm) ∈ G
m−1 uniformly over Gm−1.
2. The authority assign to each LSSS user ai a vector in G
di , called the vector of
shares. The {di}1≤i≤2d ⊂ N are public parameters. Each vector entry, a share,
is a linear combination of s and of ri’s. We denote the j-th element of the shares
vector of ah as πh,j(s, ~r), and we call l =
∑
ah∈A
dh the size of the scheme.
We can then identify a generic LSSS with a pair (B,ρ) and a vector ~v, where:
• B is an l ×m matrix used to generate all the shares.
• ρ : {1, . . . , l} → A is a function which assigns to every row of the matrix its
corresponding LSSS user.
• ~v = (s, r2, . . . , rm) is a vector in G
m which has the secret as the first component,
and the remaining ones are random elements of G.
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The authority creates the shares multiplying the matrix B by the vector ~v. Then, each
LSSS user a receives all corresponding components of the vector B · ~v, i.e., a obtains
from the authority the elements with position in the set {h | ρ(h) = a} as shares. The
sets of LSSS users who can obtain the secret are the authorized sets. The authorized
sets form an access structure A which is monotonic, since adding LSSS users does not
diminish the number of shares available for retrieving the secret.
Any authorized set S ∈ A can reconstruct the secret via linear combination of their
shares. This means that there exist some constants
{ωh,j ∈ G | ah ∈ S, 1 ≤ j ≤ dh}
such that the secret s can be obtained as
s =
∑
ah∈S
dh∑
j=1
ωh,j · πh,j(s, ~r).
More details are provided by Beimel [1].
4.4.2 Construction of the ABE scheme.
First we have to suppose that the function ρ is injective, i.e., to each attribute is
assigned only a single share. This hypothesis is used in the proof of security of RS-ABE
scheme (see Section 5.3). This restriction can be lifted by enlarging the dimensions of
the keys, as we are going to see in Section 7. For describing the construction we use
the same notation as in the previous sections.
ABE.Setup (S ,A) 7→ (MK,PI,PK): where S = ((N,G, G˜, e), g1, p1, p2, p3) and A
is a set of attributes.
We choose randomly the elements:
• γ ∈ ZN ;
• Ta ∈ Gp1 , for all a ∈ A;
• Z ∈ Gp3 .
The outputs of the function are the master secret key MK, the public information
PI,
MK = (γ, Z) PI =
(
N,G, G˜, e
)
and the (general) public key,
PK =
(
g = g1, {Ta}a∈A ,Λ = e(g, g)
γ
)
.
ABE.GenKey (PI,PK,MK,A) 7→ SKA: where A = (B, ρ) is a generic LSSS access
structure as in Section 4.4.1, of size l for a set of attributes A, such that B ∈
Ml×m(ZN) is a matrix with l rows and m columns.
We choose randomly the elements:
• r2, . . . , rm ∈ ZN ;
• s1, . . . , sl ∈ ZN ;
• Z1,i, Z2,i ∈ Gp3 , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
We also define the vector ~v = (γ, r2, . . . , rm).
The output is the secret key6 associated with the access structure A:
SKA =
({
K1,i = g
Bi·~v(Tρ(i))
siZ1,i, K2,i = g
siZ2,i
}
1≤i≤l
)
,
where Bi indicates the i-th row of the matrix B.
6Any secret key is actually a list of l key pairs. Both keys in a pair lie in Gp1p3 .
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ABE.Encrypt (PI,PK, S,M) 7→ (C,CHS): where S is a set of attributes and M is
a plaintext. First, randomly chosen s ∈ ZN , it computes
EK = Λs ∈ G˜;
then the outputs are C = M · EK and the ciphertext header:
CHS =
(
C0 = g
s, {C1,a = T
s
a}a∈S
)
.
ABE.Decrypt (PI,SKA,CHS, C) 7→ (EK,M): the output is the same session key EK
we have obtained when we ran ABE.Encrypt and the corresponding plaintext M .
Since S is authorized for A, we know that there exist some constants ωj ∈ ZN
such that ∑
ρ(i)∈S
ωi · Bi = (1, 0, . . . , 0) .
If we know the ωi’s. we can compute the session key:
EK =
∏
ρ(i)∈S
(
e(C0,K1,i)
e(C1,ρ(i),K2,i)
)ωi
; (1)
and then the plaintext M = C · EK−1.
ABE.RandomizeCT (PI,PK,EK,CHS, s) 7→
(
EK′,CHS
)
: s ∈ ZN . If we call the
components of the given header as CHS =
(
C0, {C1,a}a∈S
)
the outputs are the
rerandomized session key:
EK = EK · Λs;
and the rerandomized ciphertext header:
CHS =
(
C0 · g
s,
{
C1,a · T
s
a
}
a∈S
)
The correctness of the ABE algorithm follows from the properties of the bilinear
map e.
∏
ρ(i)∈S
(
e(C0,K1,i)
e(C1,ρ(i),K2,i)
)ωi
=
∏
ρ(i)∈S
(
e(gs, gBi·~vT si
ρ(i)
Z1,i)
e(T s
ρ(i), g
siZ2,i)
)ωi
=
∏
ρ(i)∈S
(
e(gs, gBi·~v) · e(gs, T si
ρ(i)
)
e(gsi , T s
ρ(i)
)
)ωi
=
∏
ρ(i)∈S
e(gs, gBi·~v)ωi
=
(
e(g, g)
∑
ρ(i)∈S ωiBi·~v
)s
= e(g, g)γs = Λs.
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5 The scheme
In this section we describe our construction of a key-policy RS-ABE scheme and we
show its correctness. We strongly recommend the reader to read the following scheme
description while rereading Section 2 since we use the notation we introduced before,
providing the details required to build the scheme.
5.1 Construction
RS-ABE.Setup (λ,A, Tmax, Nmax) 7→ (MK,PI,PK): We take the following steps.
1. We use the security parameter to generate a group descriptor G (λ) (De-
finition 5) using a group descriptor generator G (Definition 6). We fix a
generator g = g1 of Gp1 , and we define S =
(
(N,G, G˜, e), g1, p1, p2, p3
)
.
2. We use CS.Setup(Nmax) to obtain a perfect binary tree T with Nmax = 2
d
leaves. We choose randomly the elements γi ∈ ZN , for each node νi ∈ T.
Every node νi of the tree T is associated with the element γi.
3. We choose randomly the elements:
• Ta ∈ Gp1 , for all a ∈ A;
• Z ∈ Gp3 ;
• α ∈ ZN .
4. For each node νi ∈ T we define
MKABE,i = (γi, Z) .
Note that we are considering almost the same construction of MK as
ABE.Setup: for each node νi ∈ T we have a common Z but a different
γi. We will denote MKABE = {MKABE,i}νi∈T.
5. We define
PKABE =
(
g = g1, {Ta}a∈A
)
.
Note that we are considering almost the same construction of PK as
ABE.Setup but here PKABE does not contain e(g, g)
γi for any νi ∈ T.
6. For each node νi ∈ T we define
MKSUE,i = (α− γi, Z) .
Note that we are considering almost the same construction of MK as
SUE.Setup: for each node νi ∈ T we have a common Z but a different γi
(the same considered before). We will denote MKSUE = {MKSUE,i}νi∈T.
7. We define PKSUE containing g = g1 and some randomly chosen elements
in Gp1 .
Note that we are considering almost the same construction of PK as
SUE.Setup but here PKSUE does not contain e(g, g)
α−γi for any νi ∈ T.
The final output is:
MK = (α,T,MKABE,MKSUE) ,
PI =
(
N,G, G˜, e
)
,
PK = (Ω = e(g, g)α,PKABE,PKSUE) .
RS-ABE.GenKey (PI,PK,MK,A, u) 7→ SKA,u: this function generates a secret key
associated with the user index u and an access structure A, requiring as input
also the public information, the (general) public key and the master secret key.
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1. We run CS.Assign(T, u) and obtain a private set PVu = {Uk1 , . . . , Ukd}.
2. We consider the ABE public key PKABE and for every i from 1 to d the
ABE master private key MKABE,ki = (γki , Z). We obtain SKABE,ki by
running ABE.GenKey(PI,PKABE, MKABE,ki ,A).
Then we output the secret key:
SKA,u = (PVu,SKABE,k1 , . . . ,SKABE,kd) .
RS-ABE.UpdateKey (PI,PK,MK, T,R) 7→ TKT,R: this function generates the key
TKT,R which associates with a certain time T the corresponding set of revoked
users R. It requires the public information, the public key and the master private
key of the scheme.
1. We run CS.Cover(T, R) and obtain a covering CVR = {Uk0 , . . . , Ukm}, for
some m, and every set Uki is the set of the leaves of the subtree Sνki .
2. We consider the SUE public key PKSUE and for every i from 0 to m the
SUE master private key MKSUE,ki = (α− γki , Z). We obtain SKSUE,ki by
running SUE.GenKey(PI,PKSUE,MKSUE,ki , T ).
Then we output the time key:
TKT,R = (CVR, SKSUE,k0 , . . . ,SKSUE,km) .
RS-ABE.Encrypt (PI,PK,M, S, T ) 7→ CTS,T : we require as input the public infor-
mation, the public key, a plaintext M ∈ G˜, a set of attributes S and a time T .
The output is a ciphertext CTS,T . We choose randomly the element s ∈ ZN .
Then we run ABE.Encrypt(PI,PKABE, S,M) and SUE.Encrypt(PI,PKSUE, T,M)
in order to obtain CHABE and CHSUE. The output ciphertext is:
CTS,T = (CHABE,CHSUE, C = Ω
s ·M) .
RS-ABE.Decrypt (PI,CTS,T ,SKA,u,TKT ′,R) 7→M : we require as input the public
information, a ciphertext CTS,T = (CHABE,CHSUE, C) for a time T and a set
of attributes S, a private key SKA,u = (PVu,SKABE,k1 , . . . , SKABE,kd) for a
user u and an LSSS access structure A which contains S, a time key TKT ′,R =
(CVR,SKSUE,k0 , . . . ,SKSUE,km) for a time T
′ ≥ T and a set of revoked users
such that u 6∈ R. The output is the plaintext M .
1. We run CS.Match(CVR,PVu) and obtain a set of users of the form Uk.
2. We run ABE.Decrypt(PI,SKABE,k,CHABE) to obtain EKABE,k = e(g, g)
γks
and SUE.Decrypt(PI,SKSUE,k,CHSUE) to obtain EKSUE,k = e(g, g)
(α−γk)s,
which are the ciphertext headers used for the decryption in ABE and
SUE. By construction, the ABE ciphertext header and the SUE cipher-
text header do not depend on γk, so it is not necessary to include the
index k in CHABE and CHABE.
Then we output the plaintext:
C · (EKABE,k · EKSUE,k)
−1.
RS-ABE.UpdateCT (PI,PK,CTS,T ) 7→ CTS,T+1: the inputs are the public infor-
mation, the public key and a ciphertext. The output is a ciphertext CTS,T+1
which encrypts the same plaintext of CTS,T = (CHABE,CHSUE, C) with the time
updated by a unit. We fix CH′SUE by running
SUE.UpdateCT (PI,PKSUE,CHSUE). The output ciphertext is:
CTS,T+1 =
(
CHABE,CH
′
SUE, C
)
.
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5.2 Correctness
The decryption process finds a match for the private set and the partition of the non-
revoked users, which always exists when the user is not revoked, from the construction
of the CS scheme [13]. Then we use the keys corresponding to the found match to
retrieve the session keys of SUE and ABE. Due to the choice of the private key when
creating the keys SKA,u and TKT,R, from the correctness of the ABE and SUE schemes
we obtain EKABE,k = e(g, g)
γks and EKSUE,k = e(g, g)
(α−γk)s. The decryption process
can be expanded as:
C · (EKABE,k · EKSUE,k)
−1 =M · e(g, g)αs · (e(g, g)γks · e(g, g)(α−γk)s)−1
=M · e(g, g)αs · (e(g, g)αs)−1
=M.
The time is correctly updated by RS-ABE.UpdateCT, since we are using the update
properties of the SUE scheme.
5.3 Security for a chosen-plaintext attack
We are now ready to state the following result on the security of the key-policy RS-ABE
scheme we have just described.
Theorem 1 (Security). If Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 are valid, then the key-policy
RS-ABE scheme is secure under a chosen-plaintext attack.
The idea behind our proof starts from the strategy adopted by Lee et al. [8] for
the proof of security of their ciphertext-policy RS-ABE scheme. For our key-policy
RS-ABE scheme we want to show that a PPT adversary A plays the security game
with negligible advantage.
First we are going to define the so-called semi-functional algorithm, a slightly
modified version of the algorithm of the existing schemes. Then we define indexes to
identify each request of the adversary, and later we describe the game structure and
the reductions to our assumptions.
We use hybrid games to prove our result: we split the proof of security of the
original game in a sequence of lesser proof involving hybrid games, where a hybrid
game and the following differ only slightly. These hybrid games are constructed by
taking each single request of the adversary in account: starting from the base security
game, each ensuing game keeps each request equal to its following one, except for a
single request. During this request, the key supplied to the adversary changes, with
respect to the previous game, from standard to semi-functional.
5.3.1 Semi-functional algorithms
Here we define the semi-functional versions of the algorithm RS-ABE.GenKey, and
RS-ABE.Enrypt. In the proof of Theorem 1 (Section 6), we will also use the semi-
functional version RS-ABE.UpdateKeySF of the algorithm RS-ABE.UpdateKey but we
omit here the definition, since the SUE part of the scheme is only modified, for which
we refer to the work done by Lee et al. [8]. Henceforth we refer to the unmodified
version of those algorithms as standard. In the hybrid games the standard version of
each algorithm will be gradually swapped by its semi-functional counterpart.
For all semi-functional algorithms we fix a generator g2 of Gp2 . Then we fix
randomly in ZN two elements ζi, ηi for each node νi of the binary tree T. These
elements will be used to link each other the semi-functional keys between multiple
requests, ζi will be associated with semi-functional private key generation, and ηi will
be associated with time-update key. Moreover, for each possible attribute in A we fix
an element zi.
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RS-ABE.GenKeySF (PI,PK,MK,A, u) 7→ SKA,u: first we generate a standard pri-
vate key SK′A,u = (PVu,SK
′
ABE,k1
, . . . ,SK′ABE,kd) using the standard version
of the algorithm, RS-ABE.GenKey, considering as parameter the user u and
the access structure A = (B, ρ), B ∈ Ml×m(ZN). The private set is the set
PVu = {Uk1 , . . . , Ukd}.
We use a construction similar to the one employed in ABE.GenKey. For each ABE
key SK′ABE,kh = ({K
′
1,j ,K
′
2,j}
l
j=1) associated with the set Ukh ∈ PVu we fix
some random elements r′2,h, . . . , r
′
m,h ∈ ZN and we set ~v
′
h = (ζkh , r
′
2,h, . . . , r
′
m,h).
Then the corresponding semi-functional ABE key is given by
SKABE,kh =
({
K1,i = K
′
1,ig
Bi·~v
′
h
2 ,K2,i = K
′
2,i
}l
i=1
)
.
The output is then:
SKA,u = (PVu,SKABE,k1 , . . . ,SKABE,kd) .
SUE.EncryptSF (PI,PK, T,M, c) 7→ (C,CHT ): we omit the definition of this func-
tion, since the SUE part of the scheme is only modified, for which we refer to
the work done by Lee et al. [8].
ABE.EncryptSF (PI,PK, S,M, c) 7→ (C,CHS): first we generate a standard cipher-
text header CH′S =
(
C′0,
{
C′1,a
}
a∈S
)
associated with a set of attributes S and
a standard session key EK′.
Then the output is:
C =M · EK′,
and
CHS =
(
C0 = C
′
0g
c
2,
{
C1,a = C
′
1,ag
cza
2
}
a∈S
)
.
RS-ABE.EncryptSF (PI,PK,M, S, T ) 7→ CTS,T : first we generate a standard ci-
phertext CT′S,T = (CH
′
ABE,CH
′
SUE, C
′) using RS-ABE.Encrypt, associating it
to the set of attributes S and the time T . Now we create a semi-functional
header both for the ABE part and the SUE part of the scheme. We choose
randomly the element c ∈ ZN , and we input c in the previous functions: we run
ABE.EncryptSF(PI,PKABE, S,M, c) and SUE.EncryptSF(PI,PKSUE, T,M, c) in
order to obtain CHABE and CHSUE, discarding the session keys.
The output ciphertext is:
CTS,T =
(
CHABE,CHSUE, C = C
′
)
.
Observe that knowing the semi-functional private key and update key does not
allow us to decrypt a semi-functional encrypted text. The result of a decryption
attempt would result in a randomized plaintext.
6 Proof of Security
6.1 Key indexing
During the proof of Theorem 1 we want to be able to easily manage each different
key request made in the querying phases of the security game. Each RS-ABE private
key is a list of ABE keys, each of them associated with a different node of the tree T.
The same is true for a time-update key, which is basically a list of SUE private keys.
This means that the adversary makes multiple requests of private ABE and SUE keys
associated with the same node.
We consider for example the requests for ABE keys; the notation is identical for
SUE keys. We are going to identify each of them using a pair of integers (in, ic). The
first component is called node index, and the second component is called counter index.
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Their value is assigned as follows: suppose that a request is made for an ABE key
associated with the node ν.
• The node index in is computed in two different ways, depending on the number
of time the same node was requested.
– If this is the first time at which a key associated with the node ν was
requested, then we set in equal to the number of distinct nodes associated
with previous ABE requests.
– Otherwise, we set the in equal to the value of the node index of the previous
request for the same node ν.
In a request for the same node the node index remains always the same.
• The counter index ic is instead incremental for the same node, which means the
following.
– If this is the first time at which a key associated with the node ν was
requested, then we set ic equal to 1.
– Otherwise, we consider the counter index of the previous node and we set
ic as one more of that value.
In particular, when the same node is requested, the counter index is always
different and increasing.
6.2 Proof
Theorem 1. We start by defining the hybrid games used in the proof.
Definition of G0. The game G0 is the standard security game, defined in
Section 2.1: the private keys and time-update keys are standard, as is the challenge
ciphertext.
Definition of G1. This game is almost equal to G0, with the exception of the
challenge ciphertext, which is semi-functional, i.e., computed using RS-ABE.EncryptSF
instead of RS-ABE.Encrypt.
Definition of G1,h. The index h ranges from 0 to qn, where qn is the total
number of distinct nodes of T for which the adversary can query the corresponding
ABE private key or SUE private key. In the game G1,h the challenge ciphertext is
semi-functional, and the keys are given as follow. If the request for the ABE or SUE
key is identified by a node index in less or equal than h, then the key supplied by the
challenger is semi-functional. Otherwise, the key is a standard ABE or SUE key.
Definition of G2. In this game everything is semi-functional: the challenge
ciphertext, all the private keys and all the time-update keys.
Definition of G3. The last game is equal to G2, but the ciphertext is random,
which means that if CT′S,T = (CHABE,CHSUE, C = Ω
s ·M) is the semi-functional ci-
phertext for the plaintextM in gameG2, the ciphertext ofG3 is CT
′
S,T =
(
CHABE,CHSUE, C = Ω
t ·M
)
,
where t is a random element in ZN .
In particular we can notice how the gameG1,0 has no semi-functional keys, because
the node index is always greater than zero, meaning that G1,0 = G1. Similarly for
G1,qn : each node index is less or equal than qn, hence G1,qn = G2.
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Private key Time-update key Ciphertext
SKA,u TKT,R CTS,T
G0 S S S
G1 S S SF
G1,h
in < h in = h in > h in < h in = h in > h
SFSF SF S SF SF S
G2 SF SF SF
G3 SF SF R
Table 1: The structure of the components for each hybrid game; S means standard,
SF means semi-functional and R means random.
We call AdvGiA the advantage of the adversary A for the game Gi. G0 is the
original game, therefore AdvG0A = Adv
RS-ABE
A . Moreover, since the final game has
a randomly chosen session key, we know that the advantage for the last game is
Adv
G3
A = 0. We also use the fact that Adv
G1
A = Adv
G1,0
A and Adv
G2
A = Adv
G1,qn
A .
We split the advantage of the RS-ABE scheme using the advantages on distinguish-
ing hybrid games. This advantage will later be bounded by its advantage in solving
the problem in assumptions 1, 2, and 3 by Lemma 1, 2, and 3, which are used for the
inequality in the last line. We keep the dependence on λ implicit.
Adv
RS-ABE
A =
= AdvG0A +
(
Adv
G1
A −Adv
G1
A
)
+
qn∑
h=1
(
Adv
G1,h
A −Adv
G1,h
A
)
−AdvG3A
≤
∣∣∣AdvG0A −AdvG1A ∣∣∣+ qn∑
h=1
∣∣∣AdvG1,h−1A −AdvG1,hA ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣AdvG2A −AdvG3A ∣∣∣
≤ AdvA1B1 +
qn∑
h=1
4
((
qABEh + q
SUE
h
)
+ 1
)
Adv
A2
B2
+AdvA3B3 .
The number qABEh (respectively q
SUE
h ) is the number of ABE (respectively SUE)
key requests for the node with node index h, i.e., the highest value of a counter index in
a request with node index h. The advantagesAdvA1B1 , Adv
A2
B2
, and AdvA3B3 in the last
line are the one for an adversary who solves the assumption A1, A2, A3 respectively,
with the algorithms B1, B2, B3 defined in the corresponding lemma.
We recall now the properties of the CS scheme (Section 4.2) which estimates the
number of elements in PVu and CVR: the elements of PVu are at most log2 Nmax, and
the elements of CVR are at most rmax log2 (Nmax/rmax), where rmax is the maximum
size for a set of revoked user. Calling qsk the number of requests for RS-ABE private
keys and qtu the number of requests for time updates, we obtain that:
qn∑
h=1
(
qABEh + q
SUE
h
)
≤ qsk log2Nmax + qturmax log2
(
Nmax
rmax
)
≤ (qsk + qtu) rmax log2Nmax.
Thus the final formula is:
Adv
RS-ABE
A (λ) ≤Adv
A1
B1
(λ) +O (q · rmax · log2 Nmax)Adv
A2
B2
(λ) +AdvA3B3(λ),
where q = qsk + qtu is the total number of requests from the adversary.
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Now we prove the three aforementioned lemmas. Each lemma uses only a single
assumption: the order of presentation is based on the required assumption. For any
detail regarding the SUE scheme we refer to the paper by Lee et al. [8], since the
procedure in regard to the SUE scheme is the same.
6.2.1 Changing the ciphertext
Lemma 1. If Assumption 1 is true, then no PPT adversary A is able to distinguish
between G0 and G1, which means that
∣∣∣AdvG0A −AdvG1A ∣∣∣ is negligible with respect to
λ.
Proof. We prove this lemma by contradiction, showing that if a PPT adversary A
could distinguish between G0 and G1, then there would exist a PPT algorithm B1
which breaks assumption 1.
Let us take D = (G (λ), g1, g3) and W as inputs, the latter either of the form W1 ∈
Gp1 or W2 ∈ Gp1p2 . We create a simulator B1 that from the input constructs two
games, whose probability distribution is the same as random construction of the G0
(if W =W1) or G1 (if W =W2).
Setup phase. We follow the procedure of RS-ABE.Setup, but when applying
ABE.Setup and SUE.Setup we choose the random components of both of them by
fixing a random exponent for the corresponding subgroup generator, instead of di-
rectly making the random choices between the elements of the subgroup. Let l be
the maximum length of a label string, obtained from the maximum time Tmax as
l = dmax = ⌈log2(Tmax + 2)⌉ − 1. We choose randomly the elements a, γ ∈ ZN ;
t′j ∈ ZN , for all j ∈ A.
We fix g = g1. Then we set the ABE keys as:
MKABE = (γ, Z = g3) ;
PKABE =
((
N,G, G˜, e
)
, g,
{
gtj
}
j∈A
, e(g, g)γ
)
.
The SUE keys are generated in a similar fashion, for which we refer to the paper by
Lee et al. [8].
By choosing random exponents we are choosing random elements of the corre-
sponding groups with a uniform distribution, thus the output of this procedure has
the same probability distribution of the corresponding outputs of the standard setup
procedure. Moreover we create the binary tree T associating to each node νi a random
exponent γi. The master private key is then:
MK = (α,T,MKABE,MKSUE) .
The public key, which is given to the distinguishing adversary A, is then:
PK = (PKABE,PKSUE, g,Ω = e(g, g)
α) .
Query 1 phase. During this phase a standard private key or time-update key
is provided to each request of A, since we know everything needed in order to run
RS-ABE.GenKey or RS-ABE.UpdateKey.
Challenge phase. We receive from A the attributes S∗, the time T∗, and the
messages M0∗ and M
1
∗ upon which the adversary wish to be challenged.
A standard RS-ABE ciphertext has the form (CHABE,CHSUE, C = Ω
sM), where
CHABE =
(
C0 = g
s, {C1,i = T
s
i }i∈S
)
and CHSUE is a SUE ciphertext. We are going to
create a particular ciphertext which generates everything randomly as in the standard
construction, but which sets C0 = W . If W is of the form W1, this implies that the
key is standard, otherwise it will be a semi-functional ciphertext, thus exploiting A
gives us an advantage in distinguishing W .
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We show how to create ABE ciphertext:
CHABE =
(
C0 =W,
{
C1,i =W
ti
}
i∈S
)
.
Observe that if W =W1 = g
s
1 ∈ Gp1 , then the above header is exactly a standard
ciphertext header for the ABE scheme, since W ti = gsti1 = T
s
i . Otherwise we know
that W can be written as a product of an element of Gp1 and an element of Gp2 :
W = W2 = g
s
1g
m
2 , for some unknown generator g2. Recalling that a semi-functional
ciphertext header has the form
CHABE =
(
C0 = C
′
0g
c
2,
{
C1,i = C
′
1,ig
czi
2
}
i∈S
)
,
we can observe that the case W = W2 corresponds to a semi-functional ciphertext
header with c = m and zi = ti.
However the zi are certainly not random and independent on the value of ti,
hence there might be differences between this key and a random key generated by
ABE.EncryptSF. This is not the case: the elements ti are randomly generated in ZN ,
but we are only interested in the p1 part of ti, i.e., ti mod p1. In fact g = g1 is an
element of Gp1 , and thus has the form h
xp2p3 for some generator h of G and x ∈ ZN ,
and obviously hp1p2p3 = 1. On the other side, using the same argument we notice that
we are not interested in all the information of zi, but only on its p2 part, since g2 is a
generator of Gp2 .
From the Chinese Remainder Theorem we know that, since p1, p2, and p3 are
three distinct primes, there is a bijection from ZN and Zp1 × Zp2 × Zp3 defined by
n 7→ (n mod p1, n mod p2, n mod p3). Therefore choosing a random tj is equivalent
to choosing randomly and independently each p part.
In conclusion, the final distribution for the challenge ciphertext header is the same
as the output of RS-ABE.Encrypt if W =W1 or RS-ABE.EncryptSF if W =W2.
Query 2 phase. This phase is equal to the first querying phase.
Guess phase. We obtain the guess b from A: this is the final output of B1.
Since the adversary A has a non-negligible advantage on differentiating G0 from
G1, and this difference allows us to correctly guess the type of W , then the algorithm
B1 has a non-negligible advantage, which is a contradiction.
The proof structure we have just employed will recur many times when proving
that the difference between two games is negligible: we suppose that we are able to
distinguish the two, and from this hypothesis we will build a solver for the assumption
that are involved.
6.2.2 Changing each key
The proof of the second lemma is more involved, since we need to take care of the
ABE and SUE keys which compose each request for a private key or a time-update
request. For this reason the reduction is split in a finer sequences of games: each
game transforms into the following by changing the behavior of requests associated
only with a fixed counter index ic.
We will consider two separate cases depending on the request type, respectively
for an ABE or a SUE key. Let us fix any challenge attributes S∗ and challenge time
T∗; with the querying phase restrictions of the security game defined in Section 2.1 the
adversary is able to perform only two kinds of requests for a fixed node ν with node
index h: we can thus split the adversary into two possible types.
Definition 8. We say that an adversary A is of type 1 if each access structure A of
an ABE private key associated with the node ν does not contain the set S∗.
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An adversary A is of type 2 if the update time T of every SUE private key asso-
ciated with the node ν is less than T∗.
This distinction is not a partitioning of all the possible adversaries, but each of
them is described by at least one of these types. If we consider the description of the
challenge phase, we observe that the two types correspond to the conditions S∗ 6∈ A
and T∗ > T respectively. If by contradiction we suppose that the adversary is neither
of type 1 nor of type 2, then there exists at least a valid ABE key and a valid SUE
key for the challenge time and set of attributes. Since our security game does not
allow the requested keys to directly decipher the ciphertext, this means that the user
who owns the secret key must be revoked, u ∈ R. However this is impossible, since
we are considering only requests for the node ν: in order to be a node involved in an
ABE request, the adversary must require a private key for a user whose position on
the binary tree T is below the node ν. But if we revoke any one single user u below
the node ν, then the node ν would belong to the path from u to the root node, and
thus it would belong to the Steiner tree of the set of revoked users. This means that
any valid time-update key from a time-update request would not contain a SUE key
associated with the node ν.
We are now ready to prove the following.
Lemma 2. If Assumption 2 is true, then no PPT adversary A is able to distinguish
between G1,h−1 and G1,h, which means that
∣∣∣AdvG1,hA −AdvG1,h−1A ∣∣∣ is negligible with
respect to λ.
Proof. We consider first an adversary of type 1 which makes at most qABEh ABE key
requests for the node with node index h, and we define the corresponding hybrid
games. Each of them is based on the structure of the game G1,h−1, i.e., a game where
the requested keys for both ABE and SUE are semi-functional for the nodes with
node index less than h, standard for a bigger node index, and the ciphertext is semi-
functional. The only difference between G1,h−1 and G1,h occurs during the requests
for ABE keys associated with nodes with node index exactly equal to h. We modify
the behavior of the games basing on the value of the counter index of the node, ic. In
the following we assume that the index k ranges from 0 to qABEh .
Definition of Hk,1. We define the behavior for the i-th key request, associated
with a node index in = h basing on its counter index ic.
• If ic = k we generate a standard ABE key SK
′ = ({K1,i,K2,i}
l
i=1) as pre-
viously. We choose randomly the elements uj ∈ ZN , for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m},
δi ∈ ZN , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. We give to the adversary the following semi-
functional key:
SKABE =
({
K1,i · g
Bi·~u+δizρ(i)
2 ,K2,i · g
δi
2
}l
i=1
)
,
where the zi’s are the elements randomly chosen in order to create the ABE
semi-functional ciphertext. We call this kind private keys semi-functional of
type 1 (SF1, as suggested in [10].
• If ic < k, we create a standard ABE key SK
′ = ({K1,i,K2,i}
l
i=1) using as
parameters the access structure A and the user u given as input by the adversary,
where l is the number of rows and m is the number of columns of the matrix
B defining the access structure A = (B,ρ). We choose randomly the elements
ui ∈ ZN , for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Moreover we fix ~u = (u1, . . . , um), and then
we output the semi-functional key defined by:
SKABE =
({
K1,i · g
Bi·~u
2 ,K2,i
}l
i=1
)
.
Those keys are called semi-functional of type 2 (SF2 ).
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• If ic > k then the challenger gives to the adversary a standard ABE private key.
The two types of semi-functional keys are different from the semi-functional ABE keys
which we have previously defined in 5.3.1: the vector ~u is generated randomly each
time for every new key request, but for a semi-functional key the first component of
the vector is fixed at the start, depending on the node associated with the request.
Definition of Hk,2. This game is equal to the previous game, with the exception
that the case in = h and ic = k gives a semi-functional key of type 2, or equivalently
that the elements δi are equal to zero.
Definition of H′k,1. This game is equal to the game Hk,1, with the exception
that the cases with node index in = h and counter index ic ≥ k give a different semi-
functional ABE key. We first generate a key SK′ = (
{
K′1,i, K
′
2,i
}l
i=1
) with the same
procedure as described in gameHk,1, and then we add the contribution of the elements
ζi’s, defined in Section 5.3.1 to create the semi-functional keys. We choose randomly
the elements r2, . . . , rm ∈ ZN . We take the element ζj , where j is the index of the
node νj associated with the node index h, and we fix the vector ~v = (ζj , r2, . . . , rm).
The output is:
SKABE =
({
K′1,i · g
Bi·~v
2 ,K
′
2,i
}l
i=1
)
.
We call semi-functional of type 3 (SF3 ) the key resulting for the case ic = k.
We observe that if the starting key is standard, i.e., ic > k, then the resulting
key is semi-functional. In fact the added element does not change the distribution of
the output: the combined exponent of the element g2 is Bi · ~v +Bi · ~u = Bi · (~v + ~u),
where ~v is the vector we have previously defined, and ~u is the random vector used in
game Hk,1. In fact the first component of the sum of the two vectors is the sum of a
random element and a constant, and the other components are the sum of two random
elements in ZN . Similarly, if we start with a semi-functional key of type one we obtain
a key which has the same distribution as a randomly-generated semi-functional key of
type one.
Definition of H′k,2. This game merges the behaviors of the games Hk,2 and
H′k,1. Again, this game is equal to the game Hk,2, with the exception that the cases
in = h and ic ≥ k give a modified ABE key. The modification is the same as in game
H′k,1, which means that the keys for ic > k are semi-functional, and the key for ic = k,
which we denote semi-functional of type 4 (SF4 ), has the same distribution of the key
given in Hk,2, that is of a semi-functional key of type 2.
Definition of H′′. This game is equal to the game G1,h.
Remark 3. The only difference between semi-functional keys and semi-functional keys
of type 2 is that the latter uses random elements in lieu of the elements ζj and ηj .
We observe that the two games HqABE
h
,2 and H
′
qABE
h
,2
are equal, since the output
distribution for the only different case in = h, ic = q
ABE
h is the same. The games
H′0,1 and H
′
0,2 are equal: each ABE key associated with the node with node index
h is semi-functional. The difference between them and H′′ are only the SUE key
requests with node index h: in the formers they are standard, but in the latter they
are semi-functional. Moreover the games H0,1 and H0,2 are equal to G1,h−1.
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ABE keys SUE keys
SKABE SKSUE
Hk,1
ic < k ic = k ic > k SSF2 SF1 S
Hk,2
ic < k ic = k ic > k SSF2 SF2 S
H′
k,1
ic < k ic = k ic > k SSF2 SF3 SF
H′
k,2
ic < k ic = k ic > k SSF2 SF4 SF
H′′ SF SF
Table 2: The behavior of the security games for all requests with node index in = h;
the remaining requests are made as in G1,h−1.
We call AdvHA the advantage of the adversary A in a game H. In propositions 1, 2,
3, 4, and 5 we will prove that the advantage in distinguishing the pair of games (Hk,1,
Hk−1,2), (Hk,1, Hk,2), (H
′
k,1, H
′
k−1,2), (H
′
k,1, H
′
k,2), and (H
′
0,2, H
′′) is negligible
with respect to the security parameter λ. Thus we split the advantage in distinguishing
betweenG1,h−1 andG1,h for an adversary A1 of type 1 with the following inequalities:
Adv
G1,h−1
A1
−Adv
G1,h
A1
= Adv
H0,2
A1
−Adv
H′′
A1
=
= Adv
H0,2
A1
+
qABEh∑
k=1
(
Adv
Hk,1
A1
−Adv
Hk,1
A1
)
+
qABEh∑
k=1
(
Adv
Hk,2
A1
−Adv
Hk,2
A1
)
+
+
qABEh∑
k=1
(
Adv
H′
k,1
A1
−Adv
H′
k,1
A1
)
+
qABEh −1∑
k=0
(
Adv
H′
k,2
A1
−Adv
H′
k,2
A1
)
−Adv
H′′
A1
≤
qABEh∑
k=1
∣∣∣AdvHk−1,2A1 −AdvHk,1A1 ∣∣∣+ q
ABE
h∑
k=1
∣∣∣AdvHk,1A1 −AdvHk,2A1 ∣∣∣+
+
qABEh∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣AdvH′k,2A1 −AdvH′k,1A1
∣∣∣∣+ q
ABE
h∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣AdvH′k,1A1 −AdvH′k−1,2A1
∣∣∣∣+
+
∣∣∣∣AdvH′0,2A1 −AdvH′′A1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (4qABEh + 1)AdvA2B2 . (2)
A similar splitting can be obtained considering an adversary of type 2 who we
suppose making at most qSUEh SUE key requests for the nodes with node index h. The
full description for games involving an adversary of type 2, and the corresponding
proof for the inequality that follows, is found in Lee et al. [8]. The advantage for an
adversary A2 of type 2 in distinguishing between G1,h−1 and G1,h satisfies:
Adv
G1,h−1
A2
−Adv
G1,h
A2
≤
(
4qSUEh + 1
)
Adv
A2
B2
. (3)
Now we combine both adversary types by considering both the events the adversary
is of type 1, E1, and the adversary is of type 2, E2. If the adversary is both of type 1
and of type 2 we can arbitrarily choose one of the two types, e.g. we can assume that
they are of type 1.
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If the adversary is of type 1 we use inequality 2, otherwise we use 3. In particular,
with this setting we know than there is no difference between the games G1,h−1 and
G1,h for both an adversary of type 1 and of type 2. Thus we can now conclude the
proof with the following inequality:
Adv
G1,h−1
A −Adv
G1,h
A =
= P [E1]
(
Adv
G1,h−1
A1
−Adv
G1,h
A1
)
+ P [E2]
(
Adv
G1,h−1
A2
−Adv
G1,h
A2
)
= P [E1]
(
Adv
H0,2
A1
−Adv
H′′
A1
)
+ (1− P [E1])
(
Adv
G1,h−1
A2
−Adv
G1,h
A2
)
≤ P [E1]
(
4qABEh + 1
)
Adv
A2
B2
+ (1− P [E1])
(
4qSUEh + 1
)
Adv
A2
B2
≤
(
4(qABEh + q
SUE
h ) + 2
)
Adv
A2
B2
+ 4(qABEh − q
SUE
h )P [E1]Adv
A2
B2
≤
(
4(qABEh + q
SUE
h ) + 2
)
Adv
A2
B2
.
The last inequality is obtained by supposing qSUEh ≥ q
ABE
h , and then removing the
resulting negative term. If qSUEh < q
ABE
h we follow the same procedure, but using E2
as reference set, in particular P [E1] = 1− P [E2].
As in Lemma 1 we are going to show that if a PPT adversary were able to dis-
tinguish between the two considered games, then we would be able to exploit this
advantage in order to find a PPT algorithm which breaks Assumption 2. The only dif-
ferences with the Lemma are found in the querying phases, where the key constructions
is different between each game.
We are given the two input in Assumption 2, which are the tuple
D = (S , g1, g3, X1Y1, Y2Z1), where X1 ∈ Gp1 , Y1, Y2 ∈ Gp2 , and Z1 ∈ Gp3 , and
an element W of the group. The group element W can be with equal probability of
two different forms: either randomly chosen among all elements of G, or just among
the element of Gp1p3 . Equivalently, it can be chosen as a product of random elements,
either W = X2Y3Z3 or W = X2Z3, where X2 ∈ Gp1 , Y3 ∈ Gp2 , and Z2 ∈ Gp3 ,
everything chosen with uniform distribution.
We use the inputs to build the following simulator.
Setup phase. The setup phase generates the public and private parameters of
the scheme through random choices of exponents for each group element.
We choose randomly the elements a, γ, α ∈ ZN ; t
′
j ∈ ZN , for all j ∈ A.
Let g = g1. We set the ABE and SUE keys as:
MKABE = (γ, Z = g3) ;
PKABE =
((
N,G, G˜, e
)
, g,
{
gt
′
j
}
j∈A
, e(g, g)γ
)
.
The SUE keys are generated in a similar fashion, for which we refer to the paper by
Lee et al. [8].
This means that, maintaining the notation used in the previous scheme construc-
tions, Ti = g
t′i , w = gw
′
, ui,b = g
u′i,b , and hi,b = g
h′i,b .
Since we are choosing random exponents, when we consider their corresponding
elements of the group we are choosing them with a uniform distribution, and thus the
output of this procedure has the same probability distribution of the corresponding
outputs of ABE.Setup and SUE.Setup. We create the binary tree T associating to each
node νi a random exponent γi.
The output, given to the adversary A, is then:
PK = (PKABE,PKSUE, g,Ω) .
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The secret key, which we fully know, is
MK = (MKABE,MKSUE, α,T) .
We also generate randomly for each node νi the elements ζi, ηi ∈ ZN , which are
needed to create the semi-functional keys. We need also the elements xi, yi ∈ ZN , for
each i ∈ {0, . . . , l}, used in the construction of a SUE ciphertext.
Exception will be Proposition 5, where for a specific node νj the elements ζj and
ηj will be implicitly defined using input elements.
Query 1 phase. In this phase we give to the adversary A the required keys.
First we observe that we are able to generate standard private and time-update
keys, since we own all the needed elements of the private master key. We are also able
to build semi-functional keys, even if we cannot generate them directly, because we do
not know a generator for the subgroup Gp2 . The following constructions leverage the
element Y2Z1 given as input, and fix implicitly g2 = Y2.
Suppose that the request is associated with the node νj . A semi-functional ABE
key can be obtained with the following procedure. First we build a standard ABE
key, SK′ABE = ({K
′
1,i,K
′
2,i}
l
i=1), for the access structure A = (B, ρ), B ∈ Ml×m(ZN).
We fix some random elements r′2, . . . , r
′
m ∈ ZN and we set ~v
′ = (ζj , r
′
2, . . . , r
′
m). The
semi-functional ABE key is:
SKABE =
({
K1,i = K
′
1,i(Y2Z1)
Bi·~v
′
,K2,i = K
′
2,i
}l
i=1
)
.
The distribution is the same as a standard semi-functional key: the only difference
is the presence of the factor Z
Bi ·~v
′
1 ∈ Gp3 in K1,i, but since when we generate K
′
1,i
we use a random element of Gp3 as a factor, the contribution of this element is just
a translation inside the space Gp3 , which does not change the distribution of our
random choice. We are also able to create ABE semi-functional keys of type 2, since
its construction is the same apart from the elements ζj and ηj , which are swapped
with random elements.
We can also obtain semi-functional SUE key. Everything regarding the SUE part
of the scheme is omitted, for more details we refer to Lee et al. [8].
We must consider three different cases in the querying phase.
• If in < h we output a semi-functional key.
• If in = h the behavior of the simulator will be specified for each considered
proposition (Proposition 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
• If in > h we output a standard key.
Challenge phase. We receive the attributes S∗, the time T∗, and the mes-
sages M0∗ and M
1
∗ which the adversary wish to challenge, and then we fix a bit b
randomly in {0, 1}. We want to create a semi-functional ciphertext without knowing
the generator g2. To do so we fix implicitly X1 = g
s and Y1 = g
c
2.
The components of the ABE ciphertext are:
C0 = X1Y1;
C1,i = (X1Y1)
ti ;
CHABE = (C0, {C1,i}i∈S) .
We construct also the SUE ciphertext CHSUE using the element X1Y1. Lastly we
observe that e(X1Y1, g) = e(X1, g), which is implicitly e(g, g)
s. The ciphertext we
output to the adversary A is:
CT =
(
CHABE,CHSUE, e(X1Y1, g)
α ·Mb∗
)
.
25
The described constructions account for a correctly distributed ciphertext. More-
over, the ciphertext and the keys for the case in 6= h are uncorrelated. Thus in the
remaining propositions we must only consider the case in = h.
Query 2 phase. The second quering phase is managed as the first one.
Guess phase. We obtain the guess b from A, which is the final output of our
simulator.
To conclude the proof of Lemma 2 we need to prove the following propositions. In
each of them we describe the behavior of the simulator when the counter index is h.
We consider only the case where the aversary is of type 1, for the same result for an
adversary of type 2 we refer to Lee et al. [8].
Proposition 1. If Assumption 2 is true, then no PPT adversary A of type 1 is able
to distinguish between Hk,1 and Hk−1,2, that is,
∣∣∣AdvHk,1A −AdvHk−1,2A ∣∣∣ is negligible
with respect to λ.
Proof. If the query is for a SUE key, we give to the adversary a standard SUE key,
which we are able to build. If the request is for an ABE key, we must consider three
different cases depending on the counter index. Suppose that the access structure
is described by A = (B, ρ), where B ∈ Ml×m(ZN) and ρ is injective. The request
is associated with the node νj , corresponding to the node index in = h, which is
associated with the element γj in T.
• If ic < k we create a semi-functional ABE key of type 2.
• If ic = k we build the key relying on the element W . We choose randomly the
elements Z1,i, Z2,i ∈ Gp3 , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}; r2, . . . , rm, r
′
2, . . . , r
′
m ∈ ZN ; δi ∈
ZN , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. We set ~t = (0, r2, . . . , rm) and ~t
′
= (γj , r
′
2, . . . , r
′
m).
The given secret key is:
SKABE =
({
gBi·
~t
′
WBi·
~tW δitρ(i)Z1,i,W
δiZ2,i
}l
i=1
)
.
• If ic > k we create a standard ABE key.
The only case we need to check is when ic = k. We call g
r the p1 part of W , i.e.,
X2 = g
r, and implicitly we set g2 = Y3, the p2 part of W , when it exists. The
p3 part of W does not add any contribution, since each element composing the key
is multiplied by a random element in Gp3 . The p1 part manages the standard key
creation. In particular the private key we are building sets implicitly the vector ~v
used in the function ABE.GenKey as ~v = r~t+~t
′
, and the si elements used in the same
function implicitly as si = rδi. If the p2 part of W is 1, i.e., W ∈ Gp1p3 , then the
output key is a standard key, as needed for game Hk−1,2. Otherwise the p2 part of
W is nontrivial, and we obtain a semi-functional key of type 1. In particular (we
use the notation found in the definition of Hk,1 at the beginning of Lemma 2) the
elements zi’s are equal to the ti’s, the δi’s are the same as in the construction of an
ABE semi-functional key, and ~u = ~t.
It remains to show that the given secret key is correctly distributed. First we can
use the same argument as in Lemma 1 to observe that the output distribution does not
change because ti = zi. In fact we have previously chosen ti to be a random element
of ZN , and the occurrence of ti uses its p2 part if and only if they are used instead of
zi.
The only remaining problem is that the first component of the vector ~u is not
in general zero, but it is a random number in ZN . Nevertheless the final distribution
remains the same in this case. Since the set S is not authorized, we know that the span
of the rows associated with an attribute in S does not contain (1, 0, . . . , 0), otherwise
S would be able to decrypt the ciphertext. In particular the same is true if we consider
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the projection of each entry of the row from ZN to Zp2 , and their corresponding linear
span U . Otherwise if we consider the same linear combination in ZN then the first
element is one plus a multiple of p2, and the other elements are multiples of p2: by
computing the greatest common divisor between any multiple of p2 and N we are able
to obtain a nontrivial factor of N , thus allowing us to break Assumption 2. Therefore
we can find a vector ~w which is orthogonal to the space U , but which is not orthogonal
to (1, 0, . . . , 0). In fact if each element of U⊥ is orthogonal to (1, 0, . . . , 0), then U⊥ ⊆
〈e1〉
⊥, and since the standard bilinear product is symmetric, non-degenerate, and the
space has finite dimension, then U ⊇ 〈e1〉, which is a contradiction. We can fix a basis
including ~w: this allows us to write ~t = f ~w + ~w ′ for some f ∈ ZN , where ~w
′ belongs
to the span of the remaining elements of the base. We can choose ~w ′ with uniform
distribution, and then we can fix the unique f which zeroes the first component. With
this construction we obtain each possible element for ~t, thus a uniform distribution of
the ~v ′ in the semi-functional key corresponds to a uniform distribution for the choice
of ~t.
We want to show that an adversary has not enough information to discover f :
by knowing just ~w ′ we are not able to obtain any information about f . The only
expression where ~t appears is of the form Bi~t + δizρ(i). If we are considering a row i
for an attribute which belongs to the challenge set of attributes S, then we are not
giving any information about f , since Bi · ~w = 0 by definition of ~w. For the remaining
attributes we use the hyphothesis for which ρ is injective. In particular, there is
only one occurrence of the element zρ(i), since it does not appear in the challenge
ciphertext. The element zρ(i) is randomly chosen, and unless δi = 0 we are not adding
any information about f , since we are adding to the expression an unknown random
element. Furthermore the probability that δi = 0 becomes negligible as N grows. In
particular, an adversary is not able to distinguish the distribution of the output key
from a key created with random first component for ~t.
We have shown that the key given to the adversary in our simulator has the correct
distribution. Therefore, we have shown that this is a correct simulator. Its existence
would contradict our assumption,
Proposition 2. If Assumption 2 is true, then no PPT adversary A of type 1 is able
to distinguish between Hk,1 and Hk,2, meaning that
∣∣∣AdvHk,1A −AdvHk,2A ∣∣∣ is negligible
with respect to λ.
Proof. We consider the case in = h. As before, we consider a request for the access
structure A = (B,ρ), where B ∈ Ml×m(ZN). The request is associated with the node
νj , which is associated with the element γj in T.
• If ic < k we create a semi-functional ABE key of type 2.
• If ic = k we build the key relying on the element W . We choose randomly the
elements Z1,i, Z2,i ∈ Gp3 , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}; r1, . . . , rm, r
′
2, . . . , r
′
m ∈ ZN ; δi ∈
ZN , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. We set ~t = (r1, r2, . . . , rm) and ~t
′
= (γj , r
′
2, . . . , r
′
m).
The given secret key is:
SKABE =
({
gBi·
~t
′
(Y2Z1)
Bi·~tW δitρ(i)Z1,i,W
δiZ2,i
}l
i=1
)
.
• If ic > k we create a standard ABE key.
The only case we need to check is when ic = k. We call g
r the p1 part of W , i.e.,
X2 = g
r, and we set implicitly Y2 = g2. Observe that the p1 part of the key creates a
standard key, which sets implicitly in the construction of a standard ABE key done in
ABE.GenKey the element si as rδi, which is uniformly distributed in ZN . If W contains
no p2 part, then the key is a semi-functional ABE key of type 2, and ~v = ~t. Otherwise
if gd2 is the p2 part of W , we have also the additional component needed for the key
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of type 1, with the same δi’s and zi = ti. As before we notice how the reuse of ti as
zi does not change the result, since we are considering in one case its p1 part, and for
the other variable its p2 part. Moreover, the p3 part contribution is absorbed by the
random elements, and the other elements are independent.
We proved that the simulator is correctly distributed, thus an adversary who could
distinguish between the two games would also be able to break Assumption 2.
Proposition 3. If Assumption 2 is true, then no PPT adversary A of type 1 is able
to distinguish between H′k,1 and H
′
k−1,2, that is,
∣∣∣∣AdvH′k,1A −AdvH′k−1,2A ∣∣∣∣ is negligible
with respect to λ.
Proof. This proof follows the same procedure as the Proposition 1. In particular,
each case is equal, with two exceptions, where we add the contribution of the factor
(Y2Z1)
ζj .
• If ic < k we follow the same procedure as in Proposition 1.
• If ic = k we build the key relying on the element W . We choose randomly the
elements Z1,i, Z2,i ∈ Gp3 , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}; r2, . . . , rm, r
′
2, . . . , r
′
m, r
′′
2 , . . . ,
r′′m ∈ ZN ; δi ∈ ZN , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. We set ~t = (0, r2, . . . , rm), ~t
′
=
(γj , r
′
2, . . . , r
′
m) and ~t
′′
= (ζj , r
′′
2 , . . . , r
′′
m). The given secret key is:
SKABE =
({
gBi·
~t
′
WBi·
~tW δitρ(i)Z1,i(Y2Z1)
Bi·~t
′′
,W δiZ2,i
}l
i=1
)
.
• If ic > k we create a semi-functional ABE key.
The rest of the proof is equal to the Proposition 1, since the added factor does not
change the output distribution.
Proposition 4. If Assumption 2 is true, then no PPT adversary A of type 1 is able
to distinguish between H′k,1 and H
′
k,2, meaning that
∣∣∣∣AdvH′k,1A −AdvH′k,2A ∣∣∣∣ is negligible
with respect to λ.
Proof. This proof follows the same procedure as the Proposition 2 and Proposition 3.
In particular, each case is equal, with two exceptions, where we add the contribution
of the factor (Y2Z1)
ζj .
• If ic < k we follow the same procedure as in Proposition 2.
• If ic = k we build the key relying on the elementW . We choose randomly the el-
ements Z1,i, Z2,i ∈ Gp3 , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}; r1, . . . , rm, r
′
2, . . . , r
′
m, r
′′
2 , . . . , r
′′
m ∈
ZN ; δi ∈ ZN , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}. We set ~t = (r1, r2, . . . , rm),~t
′
= (γj , r
′
2, . . . , r
′
m)
and ~t
′′
= (ζj , r
′′
2 , . . . , r
′′
m).
The given secret key is:
SKABE =
({
gBi·
~t
′
(Y2Z1)
Bi·~tW δitρ(i)Z1,i(Y2Z1)
Bi·~t
′′
,W δiZ2,i
}l
i=1
)
.
• If ic > k we create a semi-functional ABE key.
The rest of the proof is equal to the Proposition 2, since the added factor does not
change the output distribution.
Proposition 5. If Assumption 2 is true, then no PPT adversary A of type 1 is able to
distinguish between H′0,2 and H
′′, which means that
∣∣∣∣AdvH′0,2A −AdvH′′A ∣∣∣∣ is negligible
with respect to λ.
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Proof. This proof is similar to Proposition 1. Suppose that the adversary queries for
an ABE key with node index in = h, for an access structure described by A = (B, ρ),
where B ∈ Ml×m(ZN ) and ρ is injective. The request is associated with the node νj .
Notice that we do not need to distinguish between the different counter indices, since
all keys for the two considered games with the same node index are equal.
We choose randomly the elements Z1,i, Z2,i ∈ Gp3 , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l};
r2, . . . , rm, r
′
2, . . . , r
′
m, s1, . . . , sl ∈ ZN ; ζ
′
j ∈ ZN . We call ~t = (1, r2, . . . , rm) and
~t
′
= (ζ′j , r
′
2, . . . , r
′
m). The semi-functional ABE key is:
SKABE =
({
WBi·
~tT si
ρ(i)(Y2Z1)
Bi·~t
′
Z1,i, g
siZ2,i
}l
i=1
)
.
The SUE keys are generated in a similar fashion, for which we refer to the paper by
Lee et al. [8].
We compute explicitly the components of the ABE key where W appears, ignoring
the p3 parts.
WBi·
~tT si
ρ(i)(Y2)
Bi·~t
′
= (gγjgδ2)
Bi·~tT si
ρ(i)(g2)
Bi·~t
′
= gγjBi·
~tT si
ρ(i)g
δBi·~t+Bi·~t
′
2 .
The first component of the vector γjBi·~t
′
is exactly γj , and the remaining are randomly
distributed. If the p2 part of W is equal to 1, i.e., δ = 0, then we have a standard
semi-functional ABE key construction with ζj = ζ
′
j . Otherwise the first component of
the vector δBi · ~t + Bi ·~t
′
is δ + ζ′j , which is ζj . The remaining vector elements are
again randomly distributed and independent on other key value, since from the second
element onward of ~t
′
they are randomly fixed in ZN .
6.2.3 Randomizing the ciphertext
Lemma 3. If Assumption 3 is true, then no PPT adversary A is able to distinguish
between G2 and G3, which means that
∣∣∣AdvG3A −AdvG2A ∣∣∣ is negligible with respect to
λ.
Proof. By contradiction we prove that the existence of a PPT adversary who can
distinguish between G2 and G3 implies the existence of an algorithm B3 which can
break Assumption 3.
The algorithm B3 is given the two inputs D = (S , g1, g2, g3, g
α
1 Y1, g
s
1Y2) and W .
W can be W1 = e(g1, g1)
sα or a random element W2 in Gp1 , or equivalently W2 =
e(g1, g1)
c for some random c ∈ ZN .
Setup phase. The setup phase is similar to the one in Lemma 1, with the
exception of the choice of the public parameter Ω, for which we will (implicitly) use
the same α used in the input. We choose randomly the elements a, γ ∈ ZN ; t
′
j ∈
ZN , for all j ∈ A.
Let g = g1. We set the ABE keys as:
MKABE = (γ, Z = g3) ;
PKABE =
((
N,G, G˜, e
)
, g,
{
gtj
}
j∈A
, e(g, g)γ
)
.
The SUE keys are generated in a similar fashion, for which we refer to the paper by
Lee et al. [8].
Since we are choosing random exponents, when we consider their corresponding
elements of the group, we are choosing them with a uniform distribution. Thus the
output of this procedure has the same probability distribution of the corresponding
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outputs of the standard setup procedure. We create the binary tree T associating
to each node νi a random exponent γi. Lastly we set Ω = e(g, g
αY1), which for the
bilinearity is equivalent to e(g, g)α. In particular we are implicitly setting MK =
(α,T,MKABE,MKSUE). The public key, given to A, is then:
PK = (PKABE,PKSUE, g,Ω) .
We also generate randomly for each node νi the elements ζi, η
′
i in ZN , which are needed
to create the semi-functional keys.
Query 1 phase. In this phase we supply A with all the required keys, both
private keys and time-update keys. Since we do not know α, we are not able to create
standard time-update keys; nevertheless we will show that we can still create semi-
functional keys from our inputs. We fix g2 as the generator of Gp2 used for every
semi-functional request.
• If the request is for a private key, then we first find the private set PVu for
the user u. For each node νh involved with the private set, we create its corre-
sponding ABE key. This ABE key should be generated with an ABE scheme of
private master key MKABE,PKSUE = (γh, g3): since all elements are known, we
are able to generate the corresponding ABE private key, and then we can apply
the same procedure in RS-ABE.GenKeySF to make this key semi-functional .
• Otherwise the request is for a time-update key, for which we use the procedure
shown in Lee et al. [8].
Challenge phase. We receive the attributes S∗, the time T∗, and the messages
M0∗ andM
1
∗ upon which the adversary wishes to be challenged; we fix a bit b randomly
in {0, 1}. We use both these and the inputs of B3 in order to create the needed semi-
functional ciphertext, using randomly chosen exponents. First we generate the ABE
semi-functional ciphertext. The components of the ciphertext are:
C0 = g
sY2; C1,i = (g
s
1Y2)
ti ; CHABE = (C0, {C1,i}i∈S) .
We generate also the SUE ciphertext CHSUE, as done by Lee et al. [8].
Finally we output to the adversary the ciphertext
CT =
(
CHABE,CHSUE,W ·M
b
∗
)
.
We need to prove that the above definition gives rise to the games G2 and G3
depending on the form of the given valueW . In particular we must show that the above
construction generates valid semi-functional ciphertexts. Notice that the construction
of the keys uses the term gαY1, and the ciphertexts contruction uses g
sY2, elements
which are chosen independently. Thus there is not mutual correlation between them.
The constructed ABE ciphertext is equivalent to a semi-functional ABE ciphertext
with c = t. The construction of an ABE semi-functional ciphertext involves the choice
of some random elements zi for each used attribute, but we have implicitly set zi = ti,
values used in the previous construction. Nevertheless this setting is independent from
the previous random choices, since this is the only time we have considered the p2 part
of the ti’s. Previously we have only used them in the form g
ti , which uses only the p1
part of the ti’s. Using the same argument of Lemma 1, the Chinese remainder theorem
assures us that the two parts are mutually independent.
If the element W has the form W1 = e(g1, g1)
sα, then the output is exactly a
semi-functional ciphertext, as required by the game G2, otherwise it is of the form
W2 = e(g1, g1)
c for some random c ∈ ZN , which is the output required for the game
G3.
Query 2 phase. We repeat the keys construction of the first querying phase.
Guess phase. We obtain the guess b from A, which is the final output of B3.
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The adversary A has a non-negligible advantage on differentiating G2 from G3,
which means that we can correctly guess the type of W : the algorithm B3 has a
non-negligible advantage in breaking Assumption 3, which is a contradiction.
7 Efficiency and conclusions
In this section we study the dimension of keys and ciphertexts of RS-ABE. The dimen-
sion is measured in term of group elements which compose the keys and the ciphertext,
and depends on the parameters of the scheme.
For the SUE scheme we refer to [8]. The maximum length for a SUE key is
⌈log2(Tmax + 2)⌉ + 1, where Tmax is the maximum time for the system, and a SUE
cipertext header has size that is upper-bounded by (d + 2) + 2(d) = 3d + 2 ≤
3 ⌈log2(Tmax + 2)⌉ − 1.
We analyze now the ABE scheme, starting from the key. We want to find the length
of a key associated with an LSSS access structure (B, ρ). The first thing to notice is
the hypothesis stated at the beginning of Section 4.4.2, requiring that ρ is injective, i.e.,
each attribute is assigned with a single row of the matrix B. We can extend the result
by assuming that ρ is associated with at most k rows of the matrix B. We modify the
attributes used in the scheme: if A is the set of attributes of the scheme, we consider
the set A′ = {(u, i) | u ∈ A, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}} which contains k copies of each attribute.
Then each attribute set S becomes the set S′ = {(u, i) | u ∈ S, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}}, and the
new function ρ assigns to each occurrence of an attribute one of the new corresponding
attributes, without repetitions.
An ABE private key for an LSSS access structure (B, ρ), modified to take into
account for repetitions in ρ, such that B ∈ Ml×m(ZN ) is a matrix with l rows and m
columns, has the following form:
SKA =
({
K1,i = g
Bi·~vT si
ρ(i)Z1,i,K2,i = g
siZ2,i
}
1≤i≤l
)
.
A key contains exactly 2l group elements.
An ABE ciphertext for the set of attributes S has the form
CHS =
(
C0 = g
s, {C1,i = T
s
i }i∈S
)
,
which corresponds to a size equal to |S|+ 1.
Now we merge these results together to obtain the length of the keys for the RS-
ABE scheme. The private key for a user u and an access structure A is generated
starting from the private set PVu associated with the user u: a private ABE key for
the access structure A is generated for each element of PVu . Then the private key is:
SKA,u = (PVu, SKABE,1, . . . ,SKABE,d) .
The number of elements d of the private set is smaller than log2(Nmax), as we have
noticed in Section 4.2. This means that the maximum length of a private RS-ABE
key, considering only group elements, is bounded by 2lNmax.
A time-update key can be obtained starting from a covering of the associated
revoked set R: for each element of the covering CVR a SUE key is built. Calling
r = |R|, we know from Section 4.2 that the size of the covering is bounded above
by the value r log2(Nmax/r). Therefore the maximum number of group elements is
3r log2
(
Nmax
r
)
⌈log2(Tmax + 2)⌉.
A ciphertext for a set of attributes S is composed by an element of G˜ and both an
ABE and a SUE ciphertext. The number of group elements is then |S|+⌈log2(Tmax + 2)⌉+
1.
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Upper bound Magnitude
SUE private key ⌈log2(Tmax + 2)⌉+ 1 O (log2 Tmax)
SUE ciphertext 3 ⌈log2(Tmax + 2)⌉ − 1 O (log2 Tmax)
ABE private key 2l O (l)
ABE ciphertext |S|+ 1 O (|S|)
RS-ABE private key 2lNmax O (lNmax)
RS-ABE time-update
key
3rlog2
(
Nmax
r
)
⌈log2(Tmax+2)⌉ O(rlog2(Nmax/r)log2Tmax)
RS-ABE ciphertext |S|+ ⌈log2(Tmax + 2)⌉+ 1 O (|S|+ log2 Tmax)
Table 3: The length in term of number of group elements employed. Tmax is the
maximum time used in the scheme, l is the number of rows of the matrix in the
access structure used for the key, |S| is the size of the set of attributes used for the
ciphertext, Nmax is the maximum number of users, and r is the size of the set of
revoked users in the update key.
Finally we present briefly a possible extension of our work. In this paper we
built a Key-Policy ABE scheme that allows to revoke users arbitrarily, and we prove
its security. In our scheme only a single authority can create the public parameters
and issue private keys to the users: this might be seen as a limitation for certain
practical application of the scheme, for example those in which the users fear that the
authority becomes curious. A natural follow-up for this work consists in introducing
a hierarchy to manage the key-generation process, in a similar fashion to what is done
for SSL certificates. A different problem is the trust on the authority managing the
scheme: in our setting the authority has the full power to create and revoke the keys
according to its own volition. This problem might be assuaged by distributing the
authority’s power among multiple authorities, such that a single failure would not
cause a complete collapse of the scheme. In [11, 12], the authors present two different
Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption schemes in which many different authorities
operate independently, and prove their security. As a future work may be interesting
the design of a Multi-Authority Key-Policy ABE scheme that allows user revocation,
with a full proof of security.
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